Letter from the Editors

New Future of Europe

by Mark Hallerberg and Mark Kayser

We dedicate this issue, our last, to Europe. After three years at the helm, we have completed our term and are passing on the editorship to the capable hands of Matt and Sona Golder at Penn State. We have chosen to focus on Europe both out of recognition of the 25th anniversary since the fall of the Berlin Wall, but also to commemorate the Hertie School of Governance’s role as the first institution outside of the United States to host the Comparative Politics Newsletter. It is fitting that the Comparative Politics Newsletter was, to the best of our knowledge, the first APSA newsletter to venture abroad. That this was possible speaks not only to the subject and interests of our section but to the theme of our first issue: the internationalization of political science. US trained scholars continue to spread out geographically but nevertheless remain active in scholarly debates that are increasingly cross-national in scope. One sees a large number of colleagues from the US at the now nearly five year old European Political Science Association – roughly a quarter of attendees at the first meeting – and numerous internationally based scholars at major US conferences. At the same time, research methods and, as Gerald Schneider (2014) has recently shown, productivity are converging. Political science has indeed globalized and we are happy that we and the Comparative Politics Newsletter could play a small part in the process.

The present is no less opportune a time to reflect on changes in Europe itself. Berlin has recently commemorated 25 years since the passing of the Cold War into history. This anniversary has invited reflection on the progress of Eastern Europe both in cross-national comparison (e.g., Schleifer and Treisman, 2014) and relative to the expectations at the time (e.g., Milanovic, 2014). Comparisons relative to expectations are generally disappointing.

Our first author, Jonathan Slapin, argues that neither the predicted downsides of EU enlargement – governance gridlock in an enlarged organization – nor many of its predicted benefits – more robust democracy and the rule of law in new member states – have come to fruition. That laws passed in new member states as a precondition for membership have been poorly implemented in societies missing social norms to support them suggests that the EU should adopt a more measured assessment of its ability to change societies.

Lawrence Ezrow, Jonathan Homola and Margit Tavits also focus on Eastern Europe but on a different aspect: the development of party systems. In contrast to the established democracies of Western Europe where voters reward policy moderation with votes, they find that policy extremism is electorally rewarded in new democracies. In low information environments, radical policy positions are easier to communicate to voters.

The most impressive example of policy extremism and the failure of liberal democracy to take root might be Hungary. Grigore Pop-Eleches argues that the
Hungarian experience is unlikely to be repeated in other parts of Eastern Europe. Although polarization is common across the region, and illiberal instincts of many governments and ministers all too common, the ability of Prime Minister Orban’s government to institutionalize its advantage in the constitution is unique, enabled by a rare confluence of circumstances.

While the EU might not have brought about the expected shift toward political liberalism in new members, it may have initiated unexpected developments elsewhere. A single European market lowers the cost of regional secession by allowing small countries to still enjoy economies of scale. Laia Balcells, drawing on work with Alexander Kuo and Jose Fernandez-Albertos, investigates the degree to which demands for greater autonomy stem from economic inequalities as opposed to, in the case of Spanish regions, language-based identity. Economic inequality between regions seems to play a smaller role than expected.

In contrast to secessionist minorities, identity politics for majorities is often driven by national-level “our people first” parties. Elisabeth Ivarsflaten observes that the Sweden Democrats deviate from the profile of their successful counterparts abroad. Radical right parties most often fail where they are least able to distance themselves from charges of racism. Ivarsflaten points out that other than the French National Front – and now the Sweden Democrats – no other extremist party in Europe has succeeded after directly embracing unadorned nativism as their central plank.

While many of this issue’s authors examine the consequences of EU expansion, David Howarth and Lucia Quaglia explain its deepening. A decade and a half after the introduction of EMU, Europe has moved toward its completion with the introduction of a banking union. Why only now, and why in such a modest form, are questions that they raise and address. It may indeed have required a crisis to push nation states to pool sovereignty on banking supervision and regulation despite that fact that EU fiscal constraints make it difficult for nations to act as lenders of last resort.

As in previous issues, we again include reviews of several datasets that promise to aid research in field. Barbara Geddes, Joseph Wright and Erica Frantz discuss their Autocratic Regimes Dataset, Frederick Solt reviews the latest version of his Standardized World Income Inequality Database, and Hazel Feigenblatt discusses the indicators for the Global Integrity Report.

Finally, as fits our final issue, we include an article by one of our co-editors, Mark Hallerberg, on the promise of a greater role for area studies centers from the shift toward causal identification in comparative politics research.

So long. We are no longer editors but we look forward to seeing many of you in person out there!
Post-Communist Transitions and European Integration

by Jonathan Slapin

The fall of Communism twenty-five years ago has had profound effects on European integration. In the late 1980s it was virtually inconceivable that the borders of the European Community (as the European Union (EU) was then known) would extend to Warsaw bloc nations. By the early 1990s, it seemed almost inevitable. Today eight post-Communist countries have been EU members for a full decade and two more for seven years. Prior to EU enlargement, many predicted its effects would be largely positive for the post-Communist nations (e.g. Vachudova 2005) and mixed for existing members (e.g. Schneider 2009). In post-Communist states, membership would help secure democracy and rule of law and increase opportunities for trade and investment. The prospect of EU membership would ameliorate the pains of transition to market capitalism and democracy. Existing members, meanwhile, would gain access to new markets for their goods, benefit from a new source of cheap labor, and realize increased security by having stable democracies as neighbors. However, these benefits would come at the cost of more competition. And the EU, itself, would be hamstrung by its increasing size, its decision-making processes ever more gridlocked (König and Bräuninger 2004).

After a decade of experience with post-Communist countries as EU members, we can now reflect on whether these predictions have come to pass. My recent research suggests that history has not played out as we thought it might. On the one hand, the dire consequences that some thought enlargement would have on EU decision-making have not come to fruition. On the other hand, enlargement has not proved to be a panacea for problems of democratic transition in Eastern Europe.

In a recent special issue of the Journal of European Public Policy, my co-editors Dan Kelemen, Anand Menon and I have collected articles that explore the complicated relationship between EU enlargement and integration (Kelemen et al. 2014a). The volume’s contributors find little evidence for the “conventional wisdom” that suggests a trade-off between a wider organization – that is, one with more members – and a deeper one – that is, one which fosters more cooperation. In our own contribution to the issue, we argue that there are strong theoretical reasons to think that enlargement may actually facilitate cooperation (Kelemen et al. 2014b). For example, increased transaction costs associated with decision-making in a larger organization can lead members to create and adhere to more formal rules, increasing institutionalization and integration. Indeed, European leaders have developed new rules regulating speaking time and limiting the size of delegations in the European Council and Council of Ministers. These changes have arguably made Council meetings more like legislative sessions than forums for international diplomacy. Empirically, the legislative gridlock that many thought would happen immediately following enlargement has also failed to materialize. Indeed, despite its recent enlargements, the EU has managed to react reasonably well to the economic crisis and has taken arguably unprecedented steps towards economic integration. In the same issue, Julia Gray and I find that the EU is not unique in comparative perspective. When examining regional agreements, we find that those with more members often harbor greater ambitions than those with fewer, but size has no impact on the ability of the members of an agreement to meet the goals they set for themselves (Slapin and Gray 2014).

Meanwhile, EU membership has not had the transformative effect on new members that some had hoped it might. There is little doubt that many new states have benefited tremendously from membership, including from structural funds to improve infrastructure and from Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) funds to upgrade and improve farms. Nevertheless, troubles with democracy remain throughout Eastern Europe. Recently, Viktor Orban, Prime Minister of Hungary, histrionically declared that liberal democratic states are no longer globally competitive and suggested he would move Hungary in a decidedly illiberal direction. Lisa Conant has pointed to widespread problems of human rights violations across the region, which have not receded with membership in the EU (Conant 2014).

In an ongoing research project, I borrow concepts from the law and economics literature to explain why EU integration could have had unintended negative consequences for the rule of law in post-Communist countries (Slapin forthcoming). I argue that, at the time of enlargement, governments in post-Communist countries felt immense pressure to do whatever was required of them to become members. The potential benefits of EU member-
ship were great and the negative consequences of remaining on the sidelines were also likely large. As a condition of membership, new members agreed to drastic reforms and they passed laws that they knew would be difficult to implement. Implementation problems occurred both because the mandated changes were costly, but also because the social norms and conditions necessary to support the new laws were lacking.

I argue that when the social norms and conditions necessary to support a law do not already exist, international pressure to create that law may create perverse incentives for governments and citizens. The existence of these laws, and a lack of observable compliance with them, advertises to politicians, bureaucrats and citizens that societal consensus regarding the importance of these laws is absent. It is safe to ignore any laws based on similar norms. Rather than fostering new societal consensus, these laws potentially undermine the ability of law to shape behavior. Their existence reveals to politicians, bureaucrats and citizens that it is acceptable to write laws only to violate or ignore them. This dynamic could be particularly damaging in new democracies where politicians and citizens are learning how rule of law works.

My work has been primarily theoretical, but I also provide empirical evidence that implementation of and compliance with EU law is different in post-Communist members than in older members. Moreover, laws meant to create one set of incentives in older member states can have unintended consequences in post-Communist countries. A particularly good example comes from the EU’s CAP. Post-communist land ownership patterns have meant that EU laws to support farms create bizarre incentives in much of Eastern Europe. Beginning in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the EU slowly altered farm support from the CAP to be less tied to the levels of production and types of crops, reducing the market distortions that farm subsidies create. This policy has worked well in Western Europe where farmers own almost all the farmland. In Eastern Europe, where farmland was collectivized under communism, the law has had unforeseen effects. With the fall of communism, much rural land was returned to the descendants of the farmers who had owned the land prior to collectivization. However, these heirs now lived in cities and they had no intention of returning to farm the family land. Nevertheless, by fulfilling some basic requirements to have the land declared “farmland”, they have been able to apply for and collect direct payments from CAP perfectly legally. While following the letter of the law, these individuals clearly are not following the spirit. The legal literature has dubbed this type of behavior “creative compliance” and has argued that it can have negative consequences for the rule of law (McBarnet and Whelan, 1991). The problem has been the source of some ill will towards the EU, especially among citizens not lucky enough to have farmland they can claim.

In short, this research suggests we need to carefully examine the effects of the fall of communism and Eastern enlargement on the EU and its new members. On the one hand, it has not meant a collapse of EU institutions, and warnings of dire consequences for EU decision-making following enlargement were largely overblown. On the other hand, the consequences may not have been as unambiguously good for the candidate countries as many hoped would be the case. Going forward, perhaps the EU ought to be wary of further enlargement in eastern and southeastern Europe, not because of any havoc that enlargement would wreak on EU decision-making, but rather because the EU’s ability to change the conditions on the ground in any candidate country is probably less than we would like to believe.

Jonathan Slapin is an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Houston. His email address is jslapin@uh.edu
Party Positioning and Election Outcomes: Comparing Post-Communist Europe to Established Democracies

by Lawrence Ezrow, Jonathan Homola, Margit Tavits

Existing literature on the electoral consequences of party positioning has mostly focused on advanced democracies. In this context, macro-level research looking at parties’ vote shares in real world multiparty elections concludes that parties typically gain votes when they are positioned closer to the center of the voter distribution (Ezrow 2005). Most simulation-based empirical studies using individual-level survey data from real world multiparty elections agree that centrist party positioning would increase popular support (Alvarez, Nagler, and Willette 2000; Alvarez, Nagler, and Bowler 2000; Schofield et al. 1998a, b). These findings are in line with the traditional spatial model of two-party electoral competition that predicts convergent party behavior (Downs 1957; Enelow and Hinich 1984), and with the theoretical models that assume probabilistic voting according to which parties maximize their vote shares by moderating their ideological policy programs in multiparty systems (Lin et al. 1999; de Palma et al. 1990). In short, the central election-level implication of the spatial model, that centrist parties gain more votes than noncentrist parties, has been shown to hold in two-party settings and multiparty settings.

In a recent article, “When Extremism Pays: Policy Positions, Voter Certainty, and Party Support in Postcommunist Europe”, we argue that a similar relationship between party policy moderation and vote maximization is less likely to exist in new democracies. By contrast, in these countries it is the distinctly non-centrist party positions that attract more support. This expectation is based on three specific arguments: First, the higher the voter uncertainty about a party’s position, the less electoral support is it able to attract. Second, the more centrist the policy position of a party, the more difficult it is for voters to discern what the party actually stands for. (Conversely, the more distinct (noncentrist) a party position, the clearer its message and the easier it is for voters to identify its position.) Third, extreme party positioning on a left-right scale is an especially potent signal that helps to decrease ambiguity and voter uncertainty about party positioning. This signal is likely to be most powerful in low-information environments present in new democracies due to the lack of long-established party reputations that otherwise would provide cues to voters about parties’ general policy profiles.

To evaluate these arguments, we measured party policy extremism (i.e., party policy distances) and we collected party vote percentages. To measure how far a political party is from the mean voter position, we employed the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES), which allowed us to construct measures of the mean citizen policy preference in each country, as well as measures of the parties’ positions as perceived by the citizens. Party extremism is measured, for each party, as the absolute distance between the mean citizen preference and the mean perceived position of the party.

Figure 1 plots the policy distances of parties along the x-axis, and their vote

Note: The figure presents party policy distances from the mean voter position and vote shares for parties in advanced and postcommunist democracies; including line of best fit. The data are based on respondents’ perceptions of parties’ left-right policy positions from the CSES.
percentages along the y-axis. The slope estimates of the “best-fit” lines for each set of countries depict very clear and different trends. In post-communist democracies the effect of policy distance on vote share is distinctly positive ($B = 2.54; p = .05$), indicating that parties in post-communist democracies tend to receive greater vote shares as their positions become more extreme. Alternatively, the negative slope-line for parties in advanced democracies ($B = -2.37; p = .001$) suggests that in established democracies parties benefit from adopting policies closer to the center of the voter distribution.

In our paper, we also test the mechanisms that might explain the difference in the “best fit” lines in Figure 1: namely, we evaluate the relationship between party policy extremism and voter certainty; and the relationship between voter certainty and vote share. With respect to these relationships we report evidence that (1) uncertainty about party positions repels voters, and (2) in new democracies, extreme positioning is especially effective in reducing voter uncertainty about party positions because, unlike in advanced democracies, other cues about party positions are lacking. The evidence for (1) and (2) suggests that in new democracies, non-centrist policy positions are electorally more beneficial than centrist ones, because voters are more certain about their left-right ideological positions than they are of the positions of moderate parties.

These results – between party policy distance, voter certainty, and vote share – have important implications for our understanding of the differences in electoral competition between established and new democracies. The first is that we have identified that extreme parties systematically perform better than moderate parties in new democracies, a finding that may seem obvious in retrospect but that has not been observed empirically. The second implication is that this relationship emerges because extreme positioning helps parties present clear policy signals to their electorates.

Noam Lupu’s (forthcoming) research suggests that divergent party positioning enhances mass partisanship and strengthens ties to parties in the electorate. If this is the case then party extremism may in the long-term reduce the uncertainty of the political landscape in newer democracies, strengthen party attachments in the electorate, and thus weaken the relationship between policy extremism and voter certainty (i.e. parties will not have to take extreme positions to signal clearly to voters). The incentives for parties to present extreme positions might then decrease.

1 Note that tradeoffs exist with respect to extreme party competition: On the positive side, parties taking clear stances on issues has been shown to help voters make policy-based choices (Lachat 2008). However, it is simultaneously less representative of the median voter position that is privileged by many theorists of democracy (McDonald and Budge 2005; see also Powell 2000) and it has been associated with lower levels of citizen satisfaction with democracy (Ezrow and Xezonakis 2011). Ultimately, most scholars argue that too much extreme party success hurts the quality and stability of democracy (see, for example, Sani and Sartori 1983).
Authoritarian Backsliding in Eastern Europe - “Achievements” and Limitations

by Grigore Pop-Eleches

The last few years have brought mostly bad news for liberal democracy in Eastern Europe. While bad news has come to be expected from many of the former Soviet republics, this new round of challenges has affected several new EU members, including the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Romania and particularly Hungary, raising the specter of a broader regional trend. This paper evaluates the magnitude of this backsliding trend, analyzes its main causes and concludes by discussing its implications for democracy in Eastern Europe.

With respect to the first task, the answer depends quite a bit on whether we look at regime outcomes (as reflected by a range of democratic governance indicators) or at the functioning, legitimacy and stability of democratic institutions. In terms of regime outcomes, we can compare the temporal evolution of several countries and country groups along three important dimensions of democracy - electoral process, judicial framework and independence, and independent media – as reflected in Freedom House's Nations in Transit reports of the past 15 years.

Despite the inherent limitations of checklist-type democracy scores (Schepple 2013), these scores capture not only the well-known historical legacy based differences between the various sub-regions of the former communist bloc (Pop-Eleches 2007) but also temporal trends, such as the gradual but continuous erosion of democracy in the non-Baltic former Soviet republics, Ukraine's backsliding under Yanukovych¹ and Hungary's democratic decline since 2010 (especially with respect to judicial and media independence.)²

Worrisome as they are, these declines do not yet amount to a substantial reversal of prior regime trends even for the two clearest backsliders: Hungary and, until recently, Ukraine. More importantly, the graphs show that so far a broader regional authoritarian backsliding trend has not materialize among the other new East European EU member states or the Balkan EU candidates. At most, we can detect a gradual erosion in media freedom but since this trend started around 2005 and affected both new EU members and candidates in a similar fashion, it cannot be satisfactorily explained by either post-accession backsliding (Levitz and Pop-Eleches 2010) or by the fallout of the economic crisis.

However, we need to be cautious about being too easily reassured about the resilience of even flawed and shallow democracy in post-communist Eastern Europe. While we may interpret the recent political crises in Bulgaria, Romania, and the Czech Republic as being largely (dirty) business as usual, what is more disconcerting is the tendency to settle partisan conflict by trying to sidestep or reshape democratic institutions, as happened most clearly in the Romanian government's efforts to impeach President Băsescu but was also an issue in the efforts by Czech President, Milos Zeman, to ignore the parliamentary balance in appointing a personal friend as Prime Minister. However, these efforts ultimately failed to result in the type of difficult-to-reverse institutional engineering that arguably cemented Orbán's increasingly tight grip on power in Hungary. Thus, even some of the more problematic East European cases confirm the quantitative evidence suggesting that so far the Hungarian model has failed to produce significant regional contagion.

What are the reasons for this contagion failure? An answer to this ques-

¹ While Yanukovych's fall has assuaged concerns about authoritarian consolidation, it is too early to speculate about the prospects of a genuine democratic turnaround.
² The decline in media freedom was dramatic not only by regional standards but even compared to broader global trends: thus, according to the FH Press Freedom rankings, from 2010-12 Hungary experienced the largest two-year decline of any country in the survey.
tion requires an assessment of the domestic ingredients to Orbán’s successful recipe and a broader discussion of the political dynamics of contagion in the European context.

Domestically, the Hungarian constitutional coup d’état benefited from several elements that are unlikely to be replicated in other countries at least in the short term. Most importantly, the unified parliamentary supermajority which allowed Orbán to change the constitution without any opposition input was the result of a combination of institutional factors - a mixed electoral system in Hungary that has reliably produced artificially large parliamentary majorities - and a perfect political storm - the combination of a serious political scandal and the fallout from the serious economic crisis confronting Hungary – that led to the implosion support for the Hungarian Socialist and thus left Orbán without credible mainstream political opponents. By contrast, the PR approval by popular referendum that stymied the enthusiastic initial commitment to constitutional reform by the Romanian government (Pop-Eleches 2013).

Internationally, the Hungarian government benefited from a “first-comers advantage” that second generation would-be autocrats in the EU sphere of influence won’t have. Thus, Orbán’s ability to enact decisive change with initially minimal international pushback was due to the timing of his campaign in the midst of the Euro crisis, and by Hungary’s reputation as a regional democratic frontrunner. By contrast, similar efforts by the Romanian government were met with stronger reactions from EU institutions and resulted in more significant policy reversals (Sedelmeier 2014). From this perspective, even though EU’s institutional instruments for disciplining its members are still woefully inadequate, there are reasons to be cautiously optimistic that the EU has learned an important lesson from the Hungarian case and will be more vigilant against similar future efforts. Another encouraging development, highlighted not just by the Ukrainian Euromaidan protests but by growing civic mobilization in traditionally more apathetic countries like Bulgaria and Romania, is that a new generation of East European citizens may finally express their political discontent not just by emigrating or protest voting but in a more active fashion that constrains the actions of political elites.

Even though EU’s institutional instruments for disciplining its members are still woefully inadequate, there are reasons to be cautiously optimistic that the EU has learned an important lesson from the Hungarian case and will be more vigilant against similar future efforts.

systems of most other East European countries are highly unlikely to produce such super-majorities. Furthermore, would-be copycats of Orbán’s revolution are also likely to be constrained by more restrictive procedures for constitutional reforms, such as the need for Svoboda in Ukraine reminds us, political mobilization is not necessarily pro-democratic. Second, the growing partisan polarization between mainstream parties in many countries (including Czech Republic, Romania and Bulgaria) has contributed to a noticeable deterioration of public political discourse while at the same time preventing political leaders from dealing with the pressing social and economic problems facing the region, and thus reinforcing the widespread cynicism of East European publics towards their political leaders and institutions (Mishler and Rose 1997). Whereas such disaffection may strengthen democratic oppositions in authoritarian countries (such as Russia), in the largely democratic East European countries it will further erode democratic legitimacy. Therefore, even though East European democracy has so far not been seriously threatened by extremist anti-systemic parties, its weakened immune system after more than two decades of ineffective and corrupt governance makes it vulnerable to authoritarian threats, as illustrated by the surprisingly weak domestic response to Orbán’s creeping authoritarianism and the strong showing of the extreme-right Jobbik party in successive Hungarian elections.

Given the penchant of authoritarians to learn from each other (Koesel and Bunce 2013), the question is what lessons would-be autocrats in the region will learn from the Hungarian model
following Orbán’s successful reelection in 2014. They may try to emulate and adapt democradura elements such as Fidesz’s increasingly tight control of the mass media and civil society. Or they could be inspired by its manipulation of the electoral system, which allowed it to win a 66.8% majority on a sub-45% vote share by increasing proportion of single-member district seats and the extension of voting rights to ethnic Hungarians living in neighboring countries. Alternatively, they may instead adopt potentially popular elements from Fidesz’s rhetoric and policy agenda, such as the confrontational stance towards foreign companies and international financial institutions, or the mandatory public works program for long-term social benefits recipients. Such appeals would not necessarily infringe on formal democratic institutions but will undermine liberal social and economic policies.

Beyond the Hungarian model, the prospects for democratic stability in Eastern Europe will be affected by the rapidly evolving balance-of-power contest between Russia and the West. (Cameron and Orenstein 2012) While the importance of this struggle is most obvious in Ukraine and other EU accession hopefuls in Russia’s “backyard” (especially Moldova and Georgia), it also has important reverberations for the new East European EU members. One possibility, already hinted at by the rapprochement between the Putin and Orbán governments, is that Russia will try to play a more active role in East European politics by providing an alternative source of economic and political support for governments and parties who run afoot of the EU’s liberal democratic establishment. This would mark a return to similar Russian efforts in the early 1990s and while at the time those initiatives ultimately failed, Russia’s stronger current economic position, coupled with the weaker EU leverage among its new members, could potentially lead to a more balanced geopolitical competition between the erstwhile Cold War rivals. However, Russia’s heavy-handed actions in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine lower the political appeal of playing the “Russian card” and may even trigger a rallying around the EU flag in an effort to counter the Russian threat. While the relative strength of this countervailing phenomenon depends on country/group-specific historical memories – not surprisingly the strongest anti-Russian reactions have come from Poland and the Baltics – Russia’s newfound military and political assertiveness in Eastern Europe may well strengthen the appeal of Europe among East European elites and publics. While this scenario by no means guarantees the institutionalization of well-functioning liberal democracies in the region, it will at least avert for now the threat of genuine regional authoritarian backsliding.

Redistribution and Regional Independence Movements

by Laia Balcells

The fall of 2014 has arrived with several important events related to secession and regional autonomy in Western Europe. The people of Scotland voted in September to stay in the United Kingdom in an unprecedented independence referendum in the European Union. The regional government of Catalonia is intending to hold a similar vote early in November, although both the Spanish government and the Constitutional Court have denied the possibility of a referendum on independence (Chapell 2014) and thus it is unclear how events will unfold in this region.

The political geography of redistribution, to paraphrase Beramendi (2012), is highly intertwined with demands for independence by ethnic or national groups (Bolton and Roland 1997). At first glance, this might seem less the case of Scotland, a net recipient of redistribution in the United Kingdom, but it is clearly the case of Flanders and Catalonia, which are net contributors in their respective countries. In Catalonia, support for independence has rocketed since 2010, after a Constitutional Court ruling against Catalonia’s new regional Constitution (i.e. Statute of Autonomy), which implied further devolution. In Catalonia, grievances related to political horizontal inequality (Cedermann et al. 2011) and unstable federal agreements have met unhappiness for what is perceived as excessive regional redistribution towards other regions. Redistribution motives are nonetheless often hard to distinguish from identity-related factors (Klor and Shayo 2010). In Spain, for example, both the Basque Country and Catalonia, those regions with the most salient
national identities, are among the four wealthiest regions in the country.

In research conducted with Alexander Kuo and Jose Fernandez-Albertos, we explore the public opinion dimension to this issue, and seek to measure more carefully actual preferences for inter-regional redistribution at the individual level using 2012 survey data from Spain. Our survey data give some sense of the correlates of individual-level support for different regional policy issues. Even across countries where regional demands are salient, there has been relatively less exploration of preferences for distribution across regions in contrast to the voluminous literature on inter-personal redistribution. We also explore preferences for political centralization and, within Catalonia, preferences for supporting independence in a hypothetical referendum. Table 1 shows some descriptive statistics in our data, suggesting an obvious “clash of preferences” between Spain and Catalonia. Indeed, most Spaniards outside of Catalonia (n=1428, control group) prefer more redistribution from richer to poorer regions, and also strongly prefer increased political centralization. In contrast, in Catalonia most respondents (n = 227, control group) oppose redistribution from richer to poorer regions and almost half of them oppose the central government having more control over the regions. In addition, 54% of respondents in Catalonia favor independence.

What explains the diverging set of preferences in Catalonia and the rest of Spain? More broadly, to what extent are political economy models versus “identity-oriented” explanations more important in explaining these preferences? In our research, we use observational data and experiments embedded in survey data to try to disentangle these factors.

In our data, we find quite limited support for the most straightforward political economic models that incorporate both individual and regional income as relevant predictors. As expected, individuals in poorer regions tend to be more supportive of regional redistribution, though the effect is quite modest (moving from the richest to the poorest region among Spain’s 19 regions increases support for regional redistribution by 10-12 percentage points). The effect of individual income is nonetheless quite limited in most regions. It turns out that individuals are not fully informed about their own region’s place in the distribution, as Figure 1 shows.

We employ an experimental design to see whether randomly informing some individuals of the region’s correct placement matters and we find that, on average, individuals who learn their region is richer than thought are more supportive of such redistribution. As for individuals who learn their region is poorer than thought are more supportive of regional redistribution and political institutions. We also find that identity matters, independently of fiscal considerations. For example, language (i.e. mother tongue) is one of the most significant factors explaining support for independence in Catalonia, regardless of individual income (Figure 2).

To what extent are preferences for regional redistribution and political institutional arrangements linked? In Catalonia, our data confirms that there is a significant correlation between preferences against regional redistribution and support for independence, but this relationship could vary across contexts and time periods. We also find that identity matters, independently of fiscal considerations. For example, language (i.e. mother tongue) is one of the most significant factors explaining support for independence in Catalonia.

What about identity-based arguments for regional redistribution? In our data from Spain, we find that the Basque Country and Catalonia are the regions where people show the least support for inter-regional redistribution (consistent with Amat 2012). At the individual level, we isolated the causal impact of “out-group” concerns by experimentally manipulating cultural primes; we did so by having respondents in the sample (in all regions) randomly evaluate some “out-group” regions (Catalonia, the Basque Country); within Catalonia, they randomly evaluated other regions.

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1 In Catalonia 60% believe that some regions should have more autonomy for historical reasons; 80% of Spaniards (outside Catalonia) disagree with this statement and favor “equal treatment” of all regions.

2 There is generally a moderating bias as individuals in rich regions underestimate their regions’ relative position, and individuals in poor regions overestimate.

3 Secessionist parties such as the SNP (in Scotland) and ERC (in Catalonia) make claims about the preservation of the welfare state and benefits that they argue are possible to guarantee under the unity with Spain and the UK. In Scotland there is a significant correlation, at the Local Authority level, between work benefit claimants and Yes vote in the recent referendum (Ayres 2014).
We find that when Spaniards are primed by being asked to evaluate the economic rankings of regions representing their “out-group” they display greater preferences for inter-regional redistribution, a result that holds throughout non-Catalan regions, even in areas that are also net-contributors such as Madrid. Within Catalonia, when respondents are primed by the poorest region in Spain and therefore the most obvious net recipient of transfers (i.e. Extremadura), they show significantly distinct preferences for redistribution, becoming less favorable to inter-regional redistribution. Thus, out-group priming activates preferences for or against inter-regional redistribution, and might operate in conjunction with information.

Our overall findings cast doubt on a purely political economic model of preferences for regional redistribution and regional policy issues. Of course, distinguishing between purely political economic and ‘identity-oriented’ explanations remains an empirical challenge, and more research could be done along these lines.

Taking a broader perspective, many political economy models argue that the growth of free trade in the world economy stimulates the demand for sovereignty in peripheral nations because it reduces the net benefit of attachment to a multinational state (Hechter 2000: 117; Alesina and Spolaore 2003; Rodrik 2012). The paradox of the European Union is that, by aiming at creating supranational unity, it also eased the quest for sovereignty of disenchanted regions. The absence of a clear threat of violence within the EU and the democratic consolidation of European states also encourage movements such as the Scottish or the Catalan, which are using referenda/elections as a tool for self-determination. These peaceful secessionist movements contrast with current experiences in other parts of Eurasia and the world (i.e. Ukraine), as well as with past experiences in other regions of the UK and Spain, where terrorist groups fought for self-determination during decades. The bad news for the EU states is that secessionism is far from gone in the continent: in a way, they are a byproduct of the common market, monetary stability, peace, and globalization. The good news is that self-determination movements are now using the tools of non-violence to achieve their goals, and that the era of nationalist terrorism seems to be fortunately over in Western Europe.

Laia Balcells is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at Duke University. Her email address is laia.balcells@duke.edu

Figure 1: Difference in the perceived relative location of the AC and the actual position

Figure 2: Vote in an Independent Referendum in Catalonia, by Income Decile and Language

Balcells, Fernandex-Albertos and Kuo (2014)
Unlikely New Kid on the Western European Radical Right Bloc

by Elisabeth Ivarsflaten

In the recent Swedish General Elections on September 14th, the Sweden Democrats (SD, Sverigedemokraterna) won 12.9 per cent of the national vote. The SD thus became the third largest party in the Swedish parliament (Riksdagen) gaining 29 seats over the previous election, which was their national breakthrough, to finish at a total of 49 out of 349 MPs. Sweden thereby joined the ever-widening circle of Western European countries that have an established, and politically influential, radical right party.

On the surface, the only thing about the Swedish case that needs analysis is the timing: why did it take so long before we saw a party like this rise to influence in Sweden compared to, in the two neighboring countries of Norway and Denmark? In Norway, a radical right party has been around for several decades and is now in government. In Denmark, the radical right has been around as long and it became the country’s largest party in the European Parliamentary Elections in June 2014. Yet, when we dig a bit deeper—which I will do to the extent possible in this short piece—we discover that the rise of the Sweden Democrats is more puzzling than at first glance.

But let us first look at the unsurprising aspect of the recent Swedish election result. A significant share of the electorate in Sweden, as in the rest of Western Europe, is worried about immigration and European integration. These worries can be mobilized by a political party. The political slogans picking up such worries by radical right and far right parties across Western Europe come in many shapes and forms, but the most widespread formula is "[X country’s people] first!" (so for examples, Swedes first, Danes First, Austrians first, the French first etc.) Cas Mudde’s term for this ideological outlook is nativism, Jens Rydgren called it ethno-nationalism (Rydgren 2004).

The table below shows how perfectly the Sweden Democrats’ voters line up with voters of many of the other prominent “my country first” parties: The Norwegian Progress Party (Fremestrittspartiet), the Danish People’s Party (Dansk folkeparti), the (True/Basic/Real/ or simply) Finns Party (Perussuomalaiset), Flemish Interest (Vlaams Belang), the Swiss People’s Party (Schweizerische Volkspartei), the Dutch Freedom Party (Partij Voor de Vrijheid), and the French National Front (Front National). The voters are a heterogeneous bunch, but they are similar in that they are more exclusionist than other voters in their respective countries. The pattern is exactly the same as I found and reported in an article in Comparative Political Studies in 2008. In that analysis, I used data from the first round of ESS data (2003) and argued that the voters of electorally successful radical right parties demand more exclusionist policies than other voters (Ivarsflaten 2008).

The puzzling thing about the Sweden Democrats is then not that they mobilize voters on exclusionist policies, but that they have been around since 1988 without being able to gain anything other than notoriety until the two 2014 elections. Most Western European countries have at some point in the past three decades had several far right parties or groups that gained very few

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables in exclusionism-index</th>
<th>Exclusionism-index</th>
<th>Constant</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>culturalthreat</td>
<td>5.98***</td>
<td>-5.08***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.641)</td>
<td>(.366)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>qualityoflife</td>
<td>6.68***</td>
<td>-5.69***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.604)</td>
<td>(.367)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>multicultural</td>
<td>8.97***</td>
<td>-7.53***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.910)</td>
<td>(.552)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nationalidentification</td>
<td>5.48***</td>
<td>-4.44***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.537)</td>
<td>(.285)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VlaamsBelang</td>
<td>4.68***</td>
<td>-5.43***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.834)</td>
<td>(.524)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SwissiVolkspartei</td>
<td>5.63***</td>
<td>-4.38***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.679)</td>
<td>(.384)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PartijVoorDeVrijheid</td>
<td>7.58***</td>
<td>-6.54***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.703)</td>
<td>(.433)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FrontNational</td>
<td>5.43***</td>
<td>-5.35***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.546)</td>
<td>(.369)</td>
</tr>
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Std. Err. in parentheses. *** p-value <.001; ** p-value <.01; * p-value <.05


Note: The results remain the same when controlled for demographic variables, and variables on different dimensions.

The data is from round 6 of the European Social Survey (ESS 2013). I am thankful to Lise Lund Bjänesoy for preparing the table based on analysis presented in her MA-thesis.
votes and limited, and nearly exclusively negative, attention. The British National Party and the National Democratic Party of Germany are the most prominent examples. What is puzzling about the Sweden Democrats is that this party has risen from these dubious origins to become an electorally successful and influential political actor in Sweden. That is unusual.

The voters of radical right parties are a heterogeneous bunch, but they are similar in that they are more exclusionist than other voters in their respective countries.

In an article published last year, Scott Blinder, Robert Ford and I examined the micro-level dynamic explaining the failure of these German and British parties (Blinder, Ford, Ivarsflaten 2013). We show that a large share of voters in the UK and Germany worry about immigration, but that these same voters are also highly motivated to avoid making decisions based on prejudice. In a series of general population survey experiments we find that these voters support exclusionist policies, but not when their normative concerns about prejudice are triggered. In the experiments, the mere mention of the BNP or NPD in connection with integration policies triggered normative concern and effectively reduced support for the policy. In other words, these parties are highly inefficient vehicles for mobilizing worry over immigration.

The widely successful radical right parties, by contrast, have become experts at defending themselves against accusations of prejudice and racism. Nearly all of the parties in the table have had both personnel and reputational resources to draw upon when defending themselves and their voters in these frequent and intense conflicts over racism and/or hate speech. Among the successful populist radical right we have examples of parties that started out asagrarians, as tax-protesters, as regional independence movements, or as EU-skeptics.1

But this analysis leaves us with a few puzzling cases, and the Sweden Democrats is one of them. For now it appears that the political scientist leader of the Sweden Democrats, Jimmie Åkesson and some in the group around him, have managed something which I have only seen Jean Marie le Pen do with some level of success in Western European politics previously. They stubbornly insist, from within organizations that have extreme nationalist pasts, that there is legitimate room for nationalism in contemporary politics, and that one can put the country’s own people first without breaking non-discrimination and non-racism norms.

The Sweden Democrats’ political program has changed markedly in both language and content under the leadership of Jimmie Åkesson, who took over in 2005. Even the symbols changed—a flower replaced the torch in the party emblem. The growth in electoral support coincides with Åkesson’s takeover of the leadership and the moderation of the party’s policies. Åkesson now even says that the party has “zero tolerance for racism.” SD party representatives are time and again exposed making blatantly racist remarks or even engaging in racist violence (as in the iron tube scandal), and Åkesson’s public response has been that such behavior and such remarks are unacceptable.

The example of Front National shows that it is possible to gain significant electoral support with this normatively ambiguous balancing act, even with a team that includes far-out extremists. But the examples of numerous failures in other Western European countries suggest that this is not the easiest path to electoral success on the “my own country’s people first” ticket.

Consider the BNP and UKIP in the UK. The electoral results in the last European elections showed clearly how much more electorally successful the UKIP formula is than that of the BNP. Nigel Farage is simply much better placed, both in terms of personnel and reputational resources, to counter charges of unacceptable racism than is Nick Griffin. In a way, what we have seen in Sweden since 2005 could be compared to a Farage taking over the BNP and trying to reform it instead of starting a new party such as UKIP.2

While it now appears that this unlikely operation might be working for the Sweden Democrats—a party with 49 MPs and local representatives across Sweden will not suddenly disintegrate—a primary reason is Åkesson’s persistent efforts to distance the party from it’s past.

Elisabeth Ivarsflaten is an Associate Professor in the Department of Comparative Politics at University of Bergen. Her email address is elisabeth.ivarsflaten@isp.uib.no

1 Other parties that are often counted among the successful radical right are the Austrian parties FPÖ and BZÖ, the Italian Lega Nord, and nowadays also the British UKIP. We lack voter data on these parties in this round of the ESS.

2 Interestingly, the Sweden Democrats were accepted into Nigel Farage’s parliamentary group in the European Parliament after the 2014 European Elections.
(Not) Completing Economic and Monetary Union through Banking Union

by David Howarth, Lucia Quaglia

In June 2012, the European heads of state and government agreed to deepen Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) by creating ‘Banking Union’ (BU) which was to be based on five components: a single rulebook on bank capital and liquidity; a single framework for banking supervision; a single framework for the managed resolution of banks and financial institutions; a common deposit guarantee scheme; and a common backstop for temporary financial support. Since June 2012, these five components of BU have been discussed and mostly agreed, with one noteworthy exception: little progress was made on the common deposit guarantee scheme.

On the one hand, BU amounts to a radical initiative to rebuild financial market confidence in both banks and sovereigns – especially in the euro area periphery – to stabilise the national banking systems exposed directly to the sovereign debt-bank loop (with weakening domestic banks holding a growing share of public sector debt) and to reverse the fragmentation of European financial markets. BU also implies a significant transfer of powers from the national to the EU (to be precise, the BU) level. On the other hand, the form of Banking Union agreed – what we call ‘BU-lite’ – is a considerable dilution of the June 2012 vision and far from the ‘completion’ of EMU promised by the European Council (2012). Why was BU – presented by proponents as a crucial move to ‘complete’ EMU – proposed only in 2012, over twenty years after the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty? Why has a certain design for BU been agreed and some elements of this design prioritised over others?

Our analysis takes as a starting point Dirk Schoenmaker’s ‘financial trilemma’ (2013), which examines the interplay of financial stability, international banking and national financial policies, arguing that any two of the three objectives can be combined – given the rise of globally systemic important banks – but not all three: one has to give. We argue that in the EU, there is a fourth ‘objective’ to be considered, namely participation in the single currency, hence the ‘trilemma’ becomes an ‘inconsistent quartet’. We borrow from Padoa-Schioppa’s use of the term, applied to the context of European monetary integration, just as Schoenmaker’s trilemma borrows from Mundell-Fleming. On the one hand, the single currency reinforced financial (banking) integration in the euro area. On the other hand, the single currency undermined national financial policies, because the function of lender of last resort could no longer be performed at the national level. Moreover, national resolution powers are constrained by fiscal rules in the euro area. Consequently, the safeguard of financial stability is outside the control of the national authorities and can only be achieved at the euro area level. For these reasons, euro area member state governments agreed (in some cases with great reluctance) to move to BU.

Without the menace of a major crisis, it is difficult to see how euro area member state governments would have accepted the loss of policy making powers that some elements of banking union require. The UK was positioned differently on the fourth element of the quartet, namely the single currency, thus British policy makers had less reason to seek participation in BU. Central and Eastern European member states of the EU that had banking systems dominated by foreign (mostly euro area) owned banks had an incentive to join BU because they were not in a position to safeguard financial stability domestically. BU is to replace...
the third element of Schoenmaker’s trilemma, namely national financial policies. National financial policies include regulation, which, even prior to BU was largely set at the EU level; supervision, which for large systemically important banks is to be performed by the European Central Bank (ECB) / Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) in BU; resolution, which is to be performed by the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) in BU, accompanied by the creation of a common DGS (so far, postponed) and the use of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) as a common fiscal backstop (subject to a host on conditions).

Without the menace of a major crisis, it is difficult to see how euro area member state governments would have accepted the loss of policy making powers that some elements of BU require – and notably the transfer of supervisory powers to the SSM. The possible collapse of at least one major national banking system – that of Spain – and the threat of contagion to other national banking systems, convinced many European policy makers on the need for a radical initiative. Indeed, the backtracking by several euro area member states – and notably Germany – on the transfer of policy making power after June 2012 reflects, in part, the calming of international markets and the decline in bond yields thanks to the ECB promise in late July 2012 ‘to do whatever it takes’ to save the euro.

However, in order to understand the version of BU adopted – what we refer to as BU-lite, a significantly watered down version of the June 2012 vision – we employ a comparative political economy analysis of national preferences. The countries that faced the quartet because they were members of EMU had however different preferences on the various elements of BU, depending on the concern of national policy makers for moral hazard and the configuration of their national banking (and more broadly financial) systems. To diminish the likelihood of moral hazard, creditor countries (notably Germany) sought to establish clear limits to their financial assistance to ailing banks and governments in debtor countries hit by the sovereign debt crisis – this accounted for the limited scope of the SRM, the difficulty to agree on a common DGS, and the limited amount of ESM funds and their conditional use.

The configuration of national banking systems, and in particular the degree of concentration, internationalisation of the activities of nationally-based banks, foreign penetration as well as systemic patterns in banking activities, shaped national preferences on the SSM. The very small number of German-based banks with major cross-border operations meant that one of the four elements of the inconsistent quartet was less relevant for German policy makers, thus decreasing German interest in BU. German policy makers resisted the ECB’s supervision of the country’s public Landesbanken and savings banks (what we label ‘local champions’). These banks, subject to a distinct regulatory and supervisory regime, were seen as having a ‘public’ function in Germany with strong ties to local and regional governments and traditionally reliant on Land governments for financial backing. German interest in supranational European supervision of the country’s two largest commercial banks was also limited given that their cross-border presence was more international than euro area / EU focused. The precise threshold for direct SSM supervision was a subject of considerable intergovernmental debate.

Countries, such as France, which had a banking system characterised by large internationally active banks (‘national/European champions’) with a strong cross-border presence particularly in Europe, supported a wide scope for the SSM and comprehensive BU. The French were opposed to the creation of an asymmetrical framework that would involve ECB supervision of banks holding the large majority of French bank assets, while this would not be the case in Germany and some other countries. Countries that had ailing banking systems, such as Spain (or potentially Italy because of the fragile position of the sovereign), also supported a more comprehensive BU. Most policy makers from Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) (whether inside or outwith the euro area) were in favour of BU because of the strong (often dominant presence) of euro area (Western European) banks.

The configuration of national banking systems, and in particular the degree of concentration, internationalisation of the activities of nationally-based banks, foreign penetration as well as systemic patterns in banking activities, shaped national preferences on the SSM.

The UK with its three massive ‘international champions’ with comparatively greater extra-European exposure had less reason to seek participation in a European BU. Like the CEECs, there was strong foreign bank penetration in the UK. However, unlike the CEECs, foreign bank (non-EU) presence in the UK was high – the highest in the EU at approximately half of total foreign bank assets and a quarter of total bank assets – further explaining limited British interest in banking supervision at the euro area / EU level.
The decision to create BU represents a major development in European economic governance and European integration history more generally. It will be a key topic in EU studies for years to come in the same way as EMU ‘kept scholars busy’ for more than a decade. As in the case of EMU, some initial questions worth asking – which have been flagged in this piece and are addressed in the broader research project that informs it – are: why was BU set up and why did it take the shape it did. Subsequently, once BU is fully operational, interesting questions to investigate concern the functioning of BU and its effects across the EU, especially the different ‘adaptation’ of member states to BU membership (or non membership, as it might be the case).

The decision to create BU represents a major development in European economic governance. It will be a key topic in EU studies for years to come in the same way as EMU ‘kept scholars busy’ for more than a decade.

As pointed out in this short piece, BU also provides a stimulating testing ground / laboratory for scholars working on political economy and public policy. It provides the opportunity to contribute to the comparative political economy of national banking systems (see Hardie and Howarth 2013; and Hardie et al. 2013), by investigating first how the institutional configuration of national banking systems has affected national preferences on BU and then how BU will impact upon the configuration of national banking systems. Feeding into the literature on public policy, it would be interest-
collapse, leading to underestimates of autocratic vulnerability to economic crisis. Efforts to explain how foreign policy tools – such as economic sanctions and military intervention – influence autocratic survival also frequently assess their effect on the probability of democratization. However, academics and policy-makers may want to know not only whether interventions contribute to democratization, but also whether foreign-induced autocratic collapse might lead to a new dictatorship or a failed state.

The second of these variables, “violence,” records the reported level of lethal violence during the regime collapse event. It takes one of four values: 0 for no deaths, 1 for 1–25 deaths, 2 for 25–1,000 deaths, and 3 for more than 1,000 deaths. We find in the period 1946-2010 that non-violent regime collapses are more frequent (125) than violent ones (98) and that this disparity is not simply a post-Cold War phenomenon, as illustrated in the left panel of Figure 1. Further, we show that non-violent regime collapse events are more likely to result in a subsequent democracy while violent regime collapses are more likely to yield a new autocracy (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014, 325).

The final variable, “how end,” records the mode of regime breakdown by category: foreign invasions, military coups, popular uprisings, ousters by rebel insurgents, elections, and rule changes by incumbent leaders. While others have noted that military coups are the primary means through which individual leaders in dictatorships are ousted from power (Svolik 2009, Table 1), we find that military coups account for about one-third (34%) of regime breakdown events. Other methods of coercively ousting the regime, such as popular uprisings, rebel victories, and foreign invasions constitute roughly another third of regime breakdown events (31%). Finally, non-coercive events, such as multiparty elections where the incumbent either does not compete or loses, constitute another third (34%).

The right panel of the Figure 1 shows that military coups – as a method of regime ouster – have declined in the past two decades, a finding consistent with that reported in Marinov and Goemans (2013). Other coercive modes of transition, such as rebel ouster or popular uprisings, as well as non-coercive methods, which are mostly elections, remain the primary methods of regime ouster in the post-Cold War era.

Future updates to this data set – for example extending the temporal coverage from 1946-2010 to 1946-2015 – will continue to provide information on the regime breakdown events along these three dimensions, but will not provide updated coding on “regime types.” While we acknowledge that the regime typology has been useful for many applications in comparative politics and international relations, we believe the information captured in exclusive categorical variables is best structured as continuous latent variables. In another project, we have attempted to do this using information on roughly 30 time-varying variables (Geddes, Honaker, and Wright 2014). Because collecting raw data for constructing time-varying latent dimensions is incredibly costly and time-consuming, however, we encourage other researchers to examine alternative methods, such as text-mining, for collecting these data (Ulfelder, Minhas, and Ward 2014).

Barbara Geddes is a Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Los Angeles. Her email address is geddes@ucla.edu

Joseph Wright is an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University. His email address is josephGwright@gmail.com

Erica Frantz is an Assistant Professor in Political Science at Bridgewater State University in Massachusetts. Her email address is ericaemilyfrantz@yahoo.com
Version 5.0 of the Standardized World Income Inequality Database

by Frederick Solt

Research on the causes and consequences of income inequality—or any comparison of levels and trends in income inequality across countries and over time—depends on comparable data. Although there is a great deal of data on inequality available for cross-national and over-time analyses, unfortunately most of these data are simply not comparable due to differences in the population covered, in terms of geography, age, and employment status; the welfare definition employed, such as market income or consumption; the equivalence scale applied, such as household per capita or household adult equivalent; and the treatment of various other items, such as non-monetary income and imputed rents. The Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID) was introduced in 2008 to provide researchers with income inequality data that maximize comparability for the broadest possible sample of countries and years (Solt 2009). Since then, it has become a preferred source not only for social scientists pursuing broadly cross-national research on income inequality but also for NGOs and international organizations. Version 5.0 of the dataset has just been released.

Before the SWIID, researchers were faced with a dilemma. On the one hand, they could maximize comparability by using data from only one source or, perhaps, data calculated on a single combination of welfare definition and equivalence scale. This meant, however, discarding most of the available information and giving up on making many comparisons. On the other, they could maximize country-year coverage by lumping diverse data together and including dummy variables or other similarly simple adjustments to capture the differences among their differing bases of calculation. This approach, though, involves making the assumption that the differences between these bases of calculation is always and everywhere the same. This assumption is clearly problematic: all governments do not pursue the same redistributive policies, patterns of savings and consumption across households are not the same in all countries, and so on.

The SWIID is built on a custom multiple-imputation algorithm that minimizes reliance on such problematic assumptions by using as much information as possible from proximate years within the same country. The algorithm estimates inequality statistics for the missing country-years in the very high quality, but very sparse, Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) data—deservedly considered the gold standard of cross-nationally comparable in inequality data—using over 10,000 observations of inequality drawn from major regional data collections such as Eurostat and the Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean, from national statistical offices around the world, and from the academic literature. The result, in Version 5.0, is comparable estimates for the Gini index of market- and net-income inequality in 174 countries for as many years as possible from 1960 to the present, a total of more than 4600 country-year observations.

These data far outstrip the alternative datasets in both coverage and comparability. The superior scope of the SWIID is easy to see—it more than doubles the number of country-year observations available in next largest cross-national income inequality dataset. The quality of the SWIID estimates, in turn, is evidenced by its record of out-of-sample prediction. Since 2008, the LIS has added data on 71 country-years that had been already included in the SWIID. In only 5 of these 71 country-years - that is, in just 7% - are the differences between the LIS and the earlier SWIID predictions substantively and statistically significant. Similar tests of alternative datasets yield rates three to eight times higher (Solt 2014).

The SWIID can be accessed in two ways. First, for straightforward comparisons of levels and trends in inequality or redistribution over time in as many as four countries, there is a user-friendly graphical web app. The figure displays a sample of the web app’s output. Second, for statistical analysis, the dataset is available preformatted for use with the tools developed for analyzing multiply imputed data in Stata and in R. Both can be found at http://myweb.uiowa.edu/fsolt. Complete replication files are also available for download.

Frederick Solt is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Iowa. His email is frederick-solt@uiowa.edu
The Global Integrity Report

by Hazel Feigenblatt

The Global Integrity Report is a tool for understanding the existence, effectiveness, and citizen access to accountability and anti-corruption mechanisms at the national level in countries around the world.

Prepared by local researchers and journalists by combining quantitative data gathering with qualitative reporting, the Report doesn't measure the disease of corruption. Rather, it seeks to understand the medicine applied to cure it: the public policies, institutions, and practices that deter, prevent, or punish corruption.

By understanding where those institutions are stronger or weaker, we can anticipate where corruption is more or less likely to manifest itself within a country’s public sector. Rather than act as a "name and shame" tool, the Report focuses on concrete reforms that governments and citizens can implement to build systems of integrity within their own countries.

Instead of third-party opinion polls or surveys, the Global Integrity Report is generated by teams of in-country journalists and researchers who gather original information each year through document research and interviews with key experts on the de jure as well as de facto reality of corruption and governance.

Since 2004, Global Integrity has worked with more than 1,200 of the best anti-corruption researchers, academics and journalists in more than 100 countries worldwide. Each annual Global Integrity Report consists of a unique sample of countries representing a diversity of regions and income levels.

### Evidence-based Expert Assessment Methodology

Global Integrity's evidence-based expert assessments require researchers (typically journalists, academics or civil society experts) to compile and document data points as evidence to inform and support their own final assessment. Rather than relying on experiences or preexisting perceptions by experts, the strength of Global Integrity’s methodology is that it requires a variety of current sources of information (legal review, interviews with experts, review of media stories, statistics, review of academic studies, etc.) to substantiate the scores.

Personality, language, and culture can all affect the interpretation of a particular indicator and the score assigned to it. To minimize this effect and to maximize inter-coder reliability, Global Integrity provides researchers and peer reviewers with scoring criteria for every single indicator. The scoring criteria anchor each indicator to a predefined set of criteria. In essence, the scoring criteria guide the researcher and the peer reviewer by suggesting, "If you see X on the ground, score this indicator in the following...

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<td>3.4 Budget Process Oversight &amp; Transparency</td>
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Available in: www.globalintegrity.org
way.” For “in law” indicators, scoring criteria are provided for “Yes (100)” and “No (0)” responses. For “in practice” indicators, scoring criteria are provided for 100, 50 and 0 – the researchers also have the option to score 75 or 25 whenever the higher or lower defined criteria do not accurately represent the research’s findings.

Researchers must provide a fact-based rationale to substantiate the score chosen for each indicator. They must also provide references to substantiate their narratives. The double-blind nature of the peer review process guarantees feedback free of considerations associated with who collected the data and scored the indicators and avoids a peer-influenced consensus.

In the last two years, Global Integrity has conducted an intense review, testing and improvement of the methodology. Among other aspects, researchers are now required to go beyond the experts’ opinions and provide fact-based information when possible, and they must provide a detailed narrative to substantiate their scores. In addition, in the future “in law” indicators will also have a “moderate (50)” scoring option between “Yes (100)” and “No (0).”

Implementation Gap

One particularity of the Global Integrity Report is that it includes what we call an “implementation gap” for each country. The implementation gap refers to the difference between the country’s legal framework for good governance and anti-corruption and the actual implementation or enforcement of that same legal framework.

Example:  
- 56 (legal framework)
- 26 (actual implementation)
= 30 (implementation gap)

In short, the implementation gap shows how well existing laws, regulations, and institutions are being implemented.

It often helps to tell us whether the missing ingredients to good governance are technical in nature – creating new institutions or writing new laws – or instead political. Large implementation gaps for countries are often found where high-level political will for governance reform is weaker, particularly in aid-dependent countries where governments adopt international best practices at the behest of foreign donor and but then fail to fully implement them in practice.

The implementation gap also may reveal interesting ways in which citizens are invoking their rights. For example, even if no law explicitly grants public access to financial disclosures of politicians, citizens may be using freedom of information laws and processes to obtain that very same information.

The Global Integrity Report is a work in progress. Suggestions and critical feedback from the community are welcome and valued. Please connect any time with Hazel Feigenblatt, Global Integrity’s Managing Director.

Hazel Feigenblatt is Global Integrity’s Managing Director for Research in Washington DC. Her email address is hazel.feigenblatt@globalintegrity.org

The Enhanced Role of Area Study Centers at American Universities

by Mark Hallerberg

There is a sense that area study centers are in difficulty in the United States. An obvious reason is funding constraints. Political battles in Washington have had tangible effects on the level of support for National Resource Centers (Title VI). Cuts of over 50% in funding restrict what such Centers can provide. In Political Science, more qualitative area studies work has difficulty getting published in the top journals. There are also some who argue that Area Studies Centers are certainly needed but are less relevant in public debates—in a controversial piece in the New York Times, Nicolas Kristof noted the decline of area studies in the public space and argued that academics need to do more “relevant” research.

While this decline of Centers at American universities is palpable, it is also lamentable. Changes in research practices, economies, and technology make an effective Center as, or more, important to its constituencies today than was true when National Resource Centers were first established in 1965.

To understand this argument, one should begin with the key constituencies of such a Center.

The first constituency is the research community. There is an irony that area studies in particular have been under attack precisely when the social sciences have turned back towards research methods that require more area skills rather than fewer. “Methods” have become increasingly specialized. There is much more focus in the academic literature on causal mechanisms, endoge-
neity, and sample selection. For this reason, top journals publish increasingly more articles that use survey responses and experimental methods. In development economics, experiments have become the dominant technique. Similarly, professional schools of public health need people who can contextualize the trials they do outside of the United States.

Any such work faces questions concerning internal and external validity. Take a study of tax compliance in Argentina. Is the study internally valid, that is, does the causal story fit the environment one finds in Argentina? Is there external validity, that is, does the lesson one learns in Argentina travel to other countries? Internal validity requires deep knowledge of a particular setting; one cannot easily do an experiment across 20 countries that is internally valid. Indeed, for this reason, there has been a wave of recent work in single country settings, and especially in emerging and low income countries (e.g., Samuels and Zucco (2014) on Brazil, Grossman, Humphreys, and Sacramone-Lutz (2014) on Uganda, and Malesky, Gueorgeiev, and Jensen’s forthcoming article on Vietnam).

I would expect that a good Center would be a leader in connecting cutting edge methods in the research areas that the university promotes with cutting edge study of regions and countries. Moreover, the individual studies almost by definition (e.g., they are in one setting) do a poor job of external validity. A good Center could coordinate and promote the standards and knowledge necessary to improve external validity across research studies. This, in turn, would promote the research mission of the university.

The second constituency is the student body of the university. A core mission is to educate students and to prepare them for careers in the public and private sphere. How this is done is of course important. One way is to promote exchanges of students with other universities. This can be through university summer programs based in other countries or through bi-lateral exchanges. I stress “exchange” because internationalization is not only about taking one’s students abroad but having diversity on campus at home. The stark reduction in cost for e-learning should break down borders and make it easier to bring international perspectives into the classroom.

The third constituency is “policy-makers.” In a mundane sense, they remain an important source of funding. But they also need strong Centers to guide policy decisions. This is something the policy-makers themselves seem to recognize—in a study that surveyed staff at the CIA, the State Department, and the Department of Defense almost 70% of respondents indicated that they found area studies skills as most useful for their work (Avey and Desch 2014, 231). Yet “policy-makers” include more than government officials in Washington. Regional leaders need greater understanding of how international factors affect their work. Non-governmental organizations play an increasing role in public policy decisions, as do private businesses.

The fourth constituency is the public sphere, which includes the general public as well as the private sector. The education of citizens does not end when they leave school. Companies increasingly benefit from international markets and from foreign direct investment in the United States. To take one example, consider how the business environment changes after the creation of two “common markets” in Europe and in East Asia and whom any corporation will need to interact with (or lobby) in these regions. In Europe, there is a European Parliament, a European Court of Justice, and even a common currency in a majority of Member States. In terms of disputes among firms across countries, there are mechanisms they can appeal to both in the Commission and in the Court. Some policy areas require that the business succeed in reaching policy-makers in Brussels; Microsoft, Google, and Apple all have large staffs within blocks of the key European Commission buildings. Other policy areas demand more lobbying at the national level; a defense contractor would do better being based in national capitals like Paris or Lisbon. Contrast this European set-up with the goals of “ASEAN 2015,” which are to promote the free movement of capital, goods, and “skilled labour” across the ten members as of next year. The ASEAN staff based in Jakarta is small and ineffective. Disputes among companies based in different countries are generally settled (if settled at all) in the World Trade Organization. There is potential for more coordination after 2015 across borders, but for now most lobbying would make sense in national capitals. A Center can educate businesses about opportunities and challenges in such regions.

In sum, there are important changes in comparative politics research that make area study centers more relevant. In the past, these Centers dropped in status as research moved toward big-n studies. The increasing importance of single-country (area) causal identification research strategies implies a rise again of the Area Studies Center.

Mark Hallerberg is a Professor of Public Management and Political Economy at the Hertie School of Governance. His e-mail is: hallerberg@hertie-school.org
About

The Organized Section in Comparative Politics is the largest organized section in the American Political Science Association (APSA). The Section organizes panels for the APSA’s annual meetings; awards annual prizes for best paper, best article, best book, and best data set; and oversees and helps finance the publication of this newsletter, APSA-CP.

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American Political Science Association
1527 New Hampshire Ave, NW Washington, DC 20036-1206
Phone: (202) 483-2512
Fax: (202) 483-2657
Email: apsa@apsanet.org

List of Awards 2014

Powell Graduate Mentoring Award
Co-winners: Barbara Geddes (UCLA), Karen Remmer (Duke University).

Lijphart/Przeworski/Verba Data Set Award
Winners: Hein Goemans (University of Rochester), Kristian Skrede Gleditsch (University of Essex), Giacomo Chiozza (Vanderbilt University) for Archigos: A Data Set on Leaders 1875-2004.

Luebbert Best Book Award

Luebbert Best Article Award

Sage Best Paper Award
Winner: Alberto Simpser (University of Chicago) for “The Intergenerational Persistence of Attitudes Towards Corruptions” (paper presented at the 2013 APSA Annual Meetings).
Honorable Mention: Jeffrey Conroy-Krutz (Michigan State University), Devra Moehler (University of Pennsylvania) for “Mobilization by the Media? A Field Experiment on Partisan Media Effects in Africa”.

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American Political Science Association
1527 New Hampshire Ave, NW Washington, DC 20036-1206
Phone: (202) 483-2512
Fax: (202) 483-2657
Email: apsa@apsanet.org

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by Elisabeth Ivarsflaten


(Not) Completing Economic and Monetary Union through Banking Union

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The Autocratic Regimes Data Set

by Barbara Geddes, Joseph Wright, Erica Frantz


Version 5.0 of the Standardized World Income Inequality Database

by Frederick Solt


The Enhanced Role of Area Study Centers at American Universities

by Mark Hallerberg


